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Italy’s	crisis:	Wouldn’t	it	be	simpler	if	the
government	simply	dissolved	the	people	and	elected
another?
The	decision	of	Italy’s	President,	Sergio	Mattarella,	to	veto	the	appointment	of	Paolo	Savona	as	Italian
finance	minister	has	sent	the	country	into	a	political	crisis.	Bob	Hancké	argues	that	although	Mattarella
was	legally	within	his	rights	to	do	what	he	did,	his	actions	not	only	raise	questions	about	democratic
legitimacy,	but	are	almost	certainly	not	in	Italy’s	long-term	interests.
On	Sunday,	the	Italian	President,	unhappy	with	the	finance	minister	that	the	almost	new	Italian
government	proposed,	decided	to	blow	up	the	democratic	process	rather	than	accept	the	outcome	of	the	March
election.	Just	to	be	absolutely	clear:	President	Mattarella	was	well	within	his	rights	to	do	what	he	did	–	it	is	the
constitutional	duty	of	the	President	to	protect	Italy’s	wider	interests.	And	some	of	the	policies,	economic	and
otherwise,	of	the	populist	coalition	between	the	Lega	and	M5S,	as	well	as	the	main	characters	in	the	story,	do	not
and	did	not	inspire	confidence.
But	there	are	two	problems	with	President	Mattarella’s	actions.	The	first	is	that	it	is	never	a	good	thing	in	a
democracy	if	an	indirectly	elected	politician	throws	out	the	plans	of	directly	elected	politicians.	Whatever	we	may
think	about	the	almost-new-coalition-government,	they	had	a	more	or	less	coherent	programme	and	a	functioning
majority	–	or	better,	perhaps.	Neither	were	any	worse	than	most	of	the	forty-six	post-war	Italian	governments,	and
definitely	less	lugubrious	than	the	Berlusconi	administrations	of	the	past	25	years.	And	it	shows	little	political	sense	to
put	hope	in	the	Italian	people	to	elect	a	different	government	in	five	months’	time,	after	a	government	of	technocrats
will	have	imposed	more	austerity	to	calm	financial	markets.
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And	that	brings	us	to	the	second	problem.	It	is	far	from	clear	if	Mattarella	actually	had	the	best	interests	of	Italy	in
mind.	The	key	problem	is	that	Italy	suffers	disproportionately	from	the	rigidity	of	the	eurozone’s	rules.	Unable	to
devaluate	and	locked	in	a	monetary	straightjacket,	Italy’s	export	sector	is	suffering.	In	the	past,	periodic	organised
devaluations	resolved	the	problem	by	reducing	competitive	pressures	in	the	short	run,	buying	some	breathing	time,
and	allowing	companies	to	restructure.	While	that	imposed	adjustment	costs	onto	stronger	trading	partners	such	as
Germany,	that	country	has	a	domestic	institutional	set-up	that	allows	it	to	regain	competitiveness	far	more	easily	than
the	institutionally	weaker	members	of	EMU	such	as	Italy	(and	Spain).
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This	is	exactly	what	has	happened	since	1989,	when	Germany’s	competitiveness	took	a	series	of	hits	(the	1:1	East-
Mark	conversion	in	1990,	the	ERM	alignment	in	1992,	the	formal	Maastricht	criteria	that	reduced	domestic	inflation
rates	elsewhere	to	German	levels,	and	the	institutional	Maastricht	criteria	and	their	domestic	responses	that
introduced	deflationary	incomes	policies	in	all	prospective	eurozone	members).	A	small	mutual	adjustment	between
Germany	and	Italy	would,	in	that	context,	hardly	register	on	the	map	of	German	exports.	I	explained	the	basic
mechanism	underlying	that	in	a	EUROPP	blog	post	over	six	years	ago	and	in	an	article	in	Transfer.
Not	only	is	Italy	not	very	happy	in	a	monetary	union	–	the	eurozone	is,	as	we	have	discovered,	a	particularly
dysfunctional	economic	set-up	with	absurd	rules	that	force	countries	into	deeper	recession	when	things	go	wrong,
and	with	a	de	facto	pro-cyclical	monetary	policy	that	produces	empty	inflationary	euphoria.	Member	states	with	a
high	inflation	rate	face	a	lower	real	interest	rate	and	vice	versa,	while	countries	with	a	low	inflation	rate	improve	their
competitiveness	through	a	depreciating	real	exchange	rate.	Italy	is	part	of	the	high-inflation,	low	RIR	and	high	RER
member	states,	while	Germany	is	in	the	low-inflation,	high	RIR	and	low	RER	camp.	The	upshot	is	that	the	Italian
export	industry	slowly	dies,	while	its	German	counterpart	has	never	been	leaner	(though	not	necessarily	healthier).
It	is	far	from	clear	if	such	structural	imbalances	between	member	states	can	actually	be	addressed	in	the	eurozone,
but	dismissing	a	popularly	elected	government	whose	idea	was	to	correct	that	situation	through	a	domestic
expansion	is,	under	the	circumstances,	not	necessarily	in	Italy’s	long-term	interests.	It	is	also	far	from	obvious	that
installing	a	technocratic	government	led	by	an	unreconstructed	ex-IMF	official	will	resolve	Italy’s	economic	problems.
One	commentator	pointed	out	that	the	Troika	doesn’t	need	to	come	to	Italy;	it	leads	the	government.	My	money	now
is	on	stronger	populist	parties	in	the	autumn	elections,	a	collapsed	left	and	a	centre-right	that	sees	itself	as	the	only
bulwark	against	a	populist	quasi-dictatorship.
In	short,	whatever	you	may	think	of	the	M5S	and	Lega’s	economic	policies	–	and	some	are,	indeed,	mad	–	they	are
the	first	to	actually	grab	the	bull	of	EMU	by	the	horns	and	argue	for	a	different	adjustment	path.	And	whatever	you
may	think	of	Italian	voters,	these	parties	did	so	with	a	majority	of	the	electorate	supporting	them.	Bertolt	Brecht	would
have	been	proud	of	Mattarella.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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